Purpose. To review critically the evidence for three contemporary theories of delusions.
a free market can produce (not the perfect theory but at least) successive approximations to the Truth. Discord, then, is healthy. ' Marshall & Halligan (1996, p. 3) These are the opening lines of a recent book about mental illness or`madness', which consists of case studies of a variety of delusions and hallucinations. Marshall & Halligan recognise how wide a range of opinion there exists in the contemporary literature over such fundamental questions as the value of a diagnostic approach tò schizophrenia' and what kinds of theoretical interpretation of positive and negative symptoms are possible and plausible. They commend debate and disagreement as central to the development of understanding. They also recommend the individual symptom approach, in contrast to a diagnostic one, as oåering greater promise for the future; it is just this approach which has come to prominence over the past decade in psychological approaches to delusions. In this study the authors propose to review and oåer an interim appraisal of this recent work, which has used a symptom approach to investigate delusions, considering both the theories proposed and the evidence so far amassed. They take as their focus delusions in general, although some studies consider persecutory delusions in particular. They restrict the review to cognitive theories and empirical studies of delusions, where the underlying construct is a model of performance found in the general population in the cognitive domain of interest (i.e. models of belief formation and maintenance). Their main question is : which cognitive processes, that have been investigated, are associated with the occurrence of delusions? Ultimately, at least one goal of such cognitive investigations is to specify what leads to the development and maintenance of delusions in order to inform therapeutic change, possibly, but not necessarily or exclusively, by means of cognitive therapy. The growing evidence of the eåectiveness of cognitive-behavioural approaches with delusions adds a further impetus to the task of theoretical development (Bouchard, Vallie' res, Roy & Maziade, 1996 ; Kuipers et al., 1997) .
In recent years there have been three main theoretical approaches which have stimulated empirical studies : the work of Frith, Garety and Bentall and their respective colleagues. The present authors consider each of these accounts in detail and evaluate the empirical support for each theory, before addressing a number of other issues. These include the extent to which the cause and maintenance of delusions are addressed, the theories' speci®city, whether the three approaches are compatible, contradictory or complementary, and their implications for therapy. First the concept of delusion is introduced and an earlier account of delusions proposed by Maher (1974 Maher ( , 1988 ) is reviewed.
Delusions
Delusions have traditionally been regarded as ®xed, false beliefs, held with absolute conviction and not amenable to reason (e.g. DSM IIIR, American Psychiatric Association (APA), 1987 ; Mullen, 1979) . However, research has promoted a number of changes in the conceptualization of delusions. Empirical investigations have demonstrated that delusions are dimensional (for example, levels of conviction are not always absolute and may¯uctuate), multi-dimensional (so that recovery can be determined by change in one of a number of diåerent dimensionsÐconviction, preoccupation, distress and action) and are not always ®xed and unresponsive to evidence or reason (so that some people with delusions are able to reason about them and can be responsive to contradictory ideas or experiences) (Brett-Jones, Chadwick & Lowe, 1990 ; Oltmanns & Maher, 1988 ; Strauss, 1969) . The revised DSM IV (APA, 1994 ) de®nition re¯ects at least one of these changes in acknowledging that delusions may show varying levels of conviction.
Although there are widely acknowledged problems with standard psychiatric de®nitions, most empirical studies have used operational criteria for the presence of delusions based on them. In practice, a person is found to hold a delusion if the belief is asserted with high conviction ; if it appears unlikely to respond (rapidly and signi®cantly) to evidence or reason; and if it ®ts one of the content categories to be found in diagnostic manuals (such as the Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper & Sartorius, 1974) or its more recent update, the SCAN (World Health Organisation, 1992) ). The presence of distress, preoccupation or action accompanying the belief also increases the probability that it will be described as delusional (Oltmanns, 1988) . It is therefore quite possible, in the absence of tightly de®ned operational criteria, that there may be important diåerences in the characteristics of the`delusions' reported in the literature which are reviewed below. Although the single symptom approach is thought to bring the advantage of the avoidance of the misclassi®cation of subjects (Persons, 1986) , it can be seen that this does not necessarily follow. To what extent this issue poses a problem for this research is an empirical question.
Delusions as explanations of experience
Maher (1974) oåered a cognitive account of delusions which emphasised disturbances of perception. He proposed that a delusional individual suåers from primary perceptual anomalies, fundamentally biological in nature, that involve vivid and intense sensory input. This may be an experience of increased vividness of colours, or a di¬culty in attending selectively to an auditory stimulus against background noise because of increased prominence of the latter. Some of these anomalies are experienced as hallucinations. Maher argues that the individual, being prone to experience these abnormal percepts, seeks an explanation which is then developed through normal cognitive mechanisms. The explanation (i.e. the delusion) is derived by processes of reasoning that are entirely normal. He argues that the delusion is maintained in the same way as any other strong belief : just as scientists are resistant to discon®rmation of their theories, so are deluded people equally resistant. Furthermore, he suggests that delusional beliefs are reinforced by the anxiety reduction which accompanies the development of an explanation for disturbing or puzzling experiences. Maher (1988) cites evidence in support of this view from two sources. First, it is noted that delusions occur in a large number of medical and psychological conditions which he argues indicates that delusions serve an adaptive function, secondary to whatever disturbance is caused by the pathogenic agent (Maher & Ross, 1984) . Secondly, evidence is cited that irrational beliefs can be provoked in the general population under anomalous environmental conditions, for example undetected hearing loss leading to paranoid ideas (Zimbardo, Andersen & Kabat, 1981) . As a third point, Maher argues that there is an absence of evidence for any impairment of reasoning ability,`apart from the inference made from the presence of the delusions themselves ' (Maher, 1988, p. 23 ).
Maher's account is an elegant single factor model of delusions, in which an abnormality of perceptual processing combined with paradoxically normal reasoning leads to the delusion. It is plausible where delusional beliefs accompany a readily detectable unusual sensory experience, particularly with a known pathology. However, it does not provide a complete account of all delusions. First, some delusions are found to occur in the absence of any anomalous experiences (e.g. Chapman & Chapman, 1988) . Secondly, there is growing evidence of reasoning and attributional biases in people with delusions which suggests they may display systematic diåerences in cognitive processes from those in the general population. Thirdly, it is probable that the experience of anomalous percepts (e.g. hallucinations) is a less passive process than Maher suggests, and may result, in part, from biased cognitive processes in the task of`reality discrimination ' (Slade & Bentall, 1988) . However, even if Maher's account applies only to a restricted set of delusions, his proposal is important in positing that delusions are explanations of experience, that they represent the individual's attempt to make sense of events. This contrasts very markedly with the conventional wisdom regarding delusions, dating from Jaspers (1913) , that (primary) delusions are`ununderstandable ' and psychologically irreducible. Arguably, although there exists a scattering of interesting writings on the cognitive processes involved in delusions throughout the twentieth century (see Arthur, 1964 ; Garety & Hemsley, 1994 ; and Winters & Neale, 1983 for reviews), Maher's work was the key stimulus for the renewed interest in generating psychological accounts of delusions since the 1980s. Frith (1992) has proposed that delusions of reference and of persecution (and third person auditory hallucinations) arise from an inability to represent the beliefs, thoughts and intentions of other people, a`theory of mind' de®cit. The argument can be put concisely :`By their very nature, delusions of reference, misidenti®cation and persecution are characterised by a misinterpretation of another person's behaviour or intentions. Thus the argument that these symptoms arise as a result of a de®cit in a system which enables us to infer what is in the minds of other people is straightforward' (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995, p. 6 ). Frith and colleagues also propose that the asocial behaviour and blunted aåect seen in patients with negative features re¯ects an impairment in`theory of mind ', which is thought to predate the onset of the disorder and may re¯ect an early developmental disruption.
DEFICITS IN META-REPRESENTATION (FRITH)
This theory developed from Frith's (1987) earlier suggestion that a failure of the system which monitors one's own actions and their preceding intentions (i.e. a selfmonitoring de®cit) is responsible for the anomalous experiences of thought insertion and of alien control. Thus the experience of thoughts being initiated without any awareness of the intention to initiate them would be described by a person as thought insertion. Similarly actions would appear to be determined by external forces if there was no awareness of the intention to act. Support for this de®cit in self-monitoring comes from an experimental study in which patients with experiences of alien control were less likely than controls to correct errors they had made, indirectly suggesting that they had impairments in monitoring their own actions (Frith & Done, 1989) . Since this aspect of Frith's theory primarily concerns anomalies of experience rather than delusional beliefs, this is not considered further.
Frith's model makes clear predictions about the contrasting performance of patients with schizophrenia on tasks which require theory of mind skills. These predictions are stated by Corcoran et al. (1995) . They predict poor performance from patients with negative symptoms, patients with incoherent speech and patients with delusions of reference and persecution. Patients with passivity experiences are thought to have problems with their own mental states rather than those of others and are predicted to perform such tasks normally. Patients in remission are predicted to perform normally.
Theory of mind studies
In seven recent papers`theory of mind' studies are reported (see Table 1 ) : four are by Frith and co-workers and three are by other research groups. In Frith and colleagues' ®rst three studies, the same basic design was employed. Patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were hierarchically classi®ed by current symptoms into subgroups, from negative symptoms at the top of the hierarchy to`in remission' at the bottom (see Table 1 ). The presence of any symptom from a group higher in the hierarchy automatically placed the patient into the higher group. This means that the groups also probably represent increasing levels of symptomatology and that the higher symptom groups are more mixed. (In two studies (Corcoran, Cahill & Frith, 1997 ; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) , the top two groups, negative symptoms and incoherence, are combined into one group,`behavioural signs', and Corcoran et al. (1997) combined the lowest two groups, atypical delusions and in remission.) In all three studies, there were two control groups: a`normal' control group and a smaller, mixed psychiatric control group. Measures of IQ were taken. The studies employed a variety of diåerent tasks, both verbal and non-verbal (visual), all requiring the participants to make inferences about the mental states of others.
Both`®rst order' and`second order' theory of mind tasks are used. Successful completion of ®rst order tasks requires appreciation of a character's beliefs about the world, while second order tasks involve more complex theory of mind skills and require inferences about a character's beliefs about the beliefs of another character. An example of a ®rst order task item, taken from the`Hinting Task ' devised by Corcoran et al. (1995) , requires participants to infer the real intentions behind indirect speech utterances :
Paul has to go to an interview and he's running late. While he's cleaning his shoes he says to his wife, Jane :`I want to wear that blue shirt, but it's very creased. ' Question: What does Paul really mean when he says this? Extra information: Paul goes on to say`It's in the ironing basket.' Question: What does Paul want Jane to do? The other studies also used a variety of theory of mind tasks and generally employed cross-sectional group designs. Measures of IQ and of symptoms were taken. Exceptionally, Langdon, Michie, Ward, McConaghy, Catts & Coltheart (1997) used a cognitive neuropsychological approach, testing hypotheses in a series of studies, rather than the more common experimental group design. They ®rst investigated performance on tasks and then aimed to identify associations between patterns of performance and symptom pro®les. Doody, Gotz, Johnstone, Frith & Cunningham Owens (1998) investigated the contribution of IQ to theory of mind performance and the speci®city of the de®cit to schizophrenia by selecting groups of people with learning disability and a group with aåective (depressive) psychosis.
Results from theory of mind studies
The results from all the studies showed that groups of patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia perform theory of mind tasks more poorly than non-psychiatric controls and, in most cases, than the psychiatric controls. The de®cit is greater with second order tasks, which are also generally more di¬cult for all participants. Two of Frith's more speci®c predictions are con®rmed. First, the currently symptomatic patients generally perform worse than the patients in remission, the latter group showing no de®cit. Secondly, patients with negative symptoms and incoherent speech are consistently shown to have a theory of mind de®cit, although there is evidence of a contribution to poorer performance from a more general cognitive impairment in these patients. However, the results are less clear in terms of Frith's predictions concerning persecutory delusions and passivity phenomena. In only two of the seven studies is there clear support for a theory of mind de®cit in the subgroup with paranoid symptoms, together with the expected absence of a de®cit in the passivity experiences group (Corcoran et al., 1995 ; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) . This ®nding was not replicated by Corcoran et al. (1997) who found that the paranoid and passivity groups did not diåer from each other and were both poorer at theory of mind tasks than normal controls, as, however, were the depressed} anxious control group. Doody et al. (1998) did not conduct a symptom subgroup analysis, but did ®nd stronger evidence of an association between higher negative and general symptom scores and the de®cit than with positive symptoms. Similarly Mitchley, Barber, Gray, Brooks & Livingstone (1998) found that theory of mind de®cits correlated with negative, but not positive, symptoms. Two studies failed to ®nd evidence of a speci®c theory of mind de®cit in paranoid patients (Langdon et al., 1997 ; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle! , Besche & Widlo$ cher, 1997) , although Sarfati et al.' s subgroup numbers were very small and there may also be diåerences between the studies in the classi®cation of subgroups. Langdon et al. (1997) found correlational evidence for both a theory of mind de®cit and a more general cognitive de®cit in patients with negative symptoms; however, rather than a theory of mind de®cit in patients with delusions, Langdon et al. found an unexpected but strong relationship with a more general cognitive de®cit. They argue that this may be because of a de®cit in deluded patients in probabilistic reasoning, with a failure to critically evaluate the plausibility of cause and eåect sequences, which was consistent with their observations of patients as they performed the tasks. It is important to note that performance on these tasks has generally been found to be clearly related to current IQ and memory, and the ®ndings of one study are less clear when the IQ scores are taken into account (Frith & Corcoran, 1996) . Doody et al.'s (1998) study appears to con®rm that there is a contribution to poorer performance from IQ, but that there is also`a degree of speci®city of poor theory of mind performance to a diagnosis of schizophrenia which cannot be explained by the eåect of IQ alone' (p. 402), a conclusion consistent with Mitchely et al. (1998) .
Overall, from the hierarchical arrangements of the groups in Frith and colleagues' studies and the pattern of results, it is clear that the theory of mind de®cit occurs to a greater extent in more symptomatic patients. Studies which demonstrate de®cits in patients with schizophrenia and which are correlated with symptom severity are di¬cult to interpret. Do the ®ndings merely replicate the well-established fact that patients with schizophrenia perform poorly on a variety of tasks? This is possible, although with their careful methodology and selection of subgroups, these studies do attempt to link task performance to current symptoms. The most robust ®nding from this set of studies is in fact that the most severely symptomatic patients and} or those with negative symptoms and} or speech and language disorder show the most striking`other representation' de®cits. Frith and colleagues acknowledge this, but argue that these patients also have a more general cognitive de®cit. Langdon et al. (1997) , in their study of how speci®c the de®cit is, found support for this, in that there was a clear association between negative symptoms and a more general de®cit.
Do people with persecutory delusions have a theory of mind de®cit ?
To summarise, the current evidence suggests to the present authors that de®cits in understanding the mental states of others are present in patients with current symptoms of schizophrenia, and are particularly associated with negative symptoms. These co-occur with a variety of other de®cits. Theory of mind de®cits are also present in some patients with persecutory delusions. However, while theory of mind de®cits may be a plausible factor in delusion formation and maintenance, the evidence linking other-representation de®cits speci®cally to persecutory delusions is not yet convincing. Of the three approaches reviewed in this study, this is the least investigated, and its relevance to delusions needs more study.
PROBABILISTIC REASONING BIAS (GARETY)
One of the present authors, Garety, together with David Hemsley and other colleagues (e.g. Garety, 1991 ; Garety & Hemsley, 1994) , has oåered an account of delusions in general, although based on ®ndings from studies in which the participants generally carry a diagnosis of a non-aåective`functional' psychosis, in particular schizophrenia or delusional disorder. It was argued that the literature indicates that delusions are unlikely to share a common cause but that a number of factors contribute to their formation and maintenance. Garety & Hemsley (1994) set out a multifactorial model in which past experience, aåect, self-esteem and motivation play a part in some delusions, while in others biases in perception and judgment are prominent. Normal processes of belief formation and maintenance also come into play, such as selective attention and con®rmation bias. In some cases also, there is thought to be a dynamic interplay between a number of these processes which combine to operate as interacting causal mechanisms. Such an account does not generate clear predictions about group diåerences ; rather, it demands the detailed assessment of the individual case in order to identify the activation of particular processes.
Although favouring this multifactorial account, it was proposed that the literature suggested that probabilistic reasoning might be implicated in delusions. A number of studies had identi®ed a tendency for people with delusions to`jump ' to conclusions (see Garety & Hemsley, 1994, chapter 3) . A di¬culty with some of the earlier studies of reasoning and delusions, however, was the assumption that people reason logically. Studies focused on tests of formal logic, which in general were performed poorly by controls as well as people with delusions. It is clear that reasoning is not restricted to logic and that people typically employ a number of heuristic devices which guide expectations and assist reasoning, although they may also lead to errors (Ross & Anderson, 1982) . In order to study how people reason, Fischhoå & Beyth-Marom (1983) have argued that a normative framework is needed to provide a conceptual framework within which the actual performance of people can be studied. This does not assume that people adhere to the standards set by the normative framework. A Bayesian model of probabilistic inference provides a useful framework for investigating probabilistic reasoning in people with delusions, since it does not simply measure valid conclusions or errors, but assesses the way conclusions are reached. Making inferences results from a combination of the strength of the prior belief and the current situational information (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) .
Bayesian inference provides a general framework for evaluating beliefs as they are formed and maintained, since it incorporates the level of the prior belief and governs the way in which the strength of one's belief in a hypothesis should be revised in the light of new information (Fischhoå & Beyth-Marom, 1983 ). Garety & Hemsley predicted that, on a Bayesian inference task, people with delusions would make more rapid and overcon®dent judgments than other clinical and non-clinical controls. They did not hypothesize that this bias would be speci®c to certain types of delusions or to people with delusions only with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Garety & Hemsley, 1994 ; Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988) .
Studies of probabilistic reasoning
In a typical experiment on probability judgments (Phillips & Edwards, 1966) , participants are shown pairs of containers (e.g. jars), labelled A and B, holding a large number of items such as beads of two diåerent colours, in a particular ratio ; for example, 100 beads may be divided into 85 green and 15 red, and vice versa. Participants are informed of the proportions, and the containers are removed from view. They are then told that either container is equally likely to be chosen: the initial prior probabilities in Bayesian terms are thus always 50A :50B. One of the containers is then chosen, still hidden from view, and a bead is drawn from it and shown to the participant. The experiment is continued, with beads being drawn sequentially and always replaced. Although the participants are told that beads are being selected randomly, the sequence of colours is predetermined according to the ratio of the two colours. The task is to work out whether the experimenter is drawing from container A or container B. Typically, the experiment has two conditions:`draws to decision ' and`probability estimates '. In`draws to decision ', the participants are free to determine how many beads are drawn and the trial is only terminated once they a¬rm that they are certain about their choice. In`probability estimates ', participants are asked to indicate at each stage in the sequence estimates of the probability of one container having been chosen rather than the other. In this condition, there is a ®xed number of trials. There is an`optimal ' strategy for performance on these tasks which can be computed using Bayes' theorem. It has been noted that the general population is consistently conservative in these tasks, requiring more draws than Bayes' theorem would indicate to reach a decision and giving under-con®dent probability estimates (Edwards, 1982) . Eight studies of probabilistic reasoning, all using modi®cations of the basic paradigm, are shown in Table 2 . In most studies coloured beads are used in ratios of 85 : 15. This ratio creates an easy task, which minimises¯oor eåects. In addition to investigating jumping to conclusions (JTC) on the basis of either draws to decision or probability estimates, Garety, Hemsley & Wessely (1991) and four subsequent studies examined the readiness of participants to switch their hypotheses when given potentially contradictory evidence. Dudley, John, Young & Over (1997a,b) and Young & Bentall (1997a) investigated performance with diåerent ratios of beads; they also introduced concrete and emotionally salient task materials. There are some other diåerences between studies: these are in the selection criteria for people with delusions (diagnosis; types of delusions), the selection of clinical control groups, and the total number of trials given.
Results from probabilistic reasoning studies
The main ®ndings from these studies can be summarised thus. First, JTC has been found in seven studies. Only Young & Bentall (1997a) failed to replicate the ®nding. JTC was found in all seven studies using draws to decision. In contrast, JTC is not found when a ®xed number of trials are presented and probability estimates are required; in those cases, the deluded participants performed more like the controls, although two studies (Huq et al., 1988 ; Peters, Day & Garety, 1997) found some diåerences relative to controls. JTC is not a function of a memory de®cit, since results were unchanged by the presence of a memory aid, or of impulsiveness, since the deluded group adjusted the amount of evidence required with a changed probability ratio (Dudley et al., 1997a) . JTC is found in people with delusions, irrespective of a diagnosis of schizophrenia or of delusional disorder, and in people with schizophrenia where the current delusional status is less clear (Mortimer et al., 1996) . Mortimer et al. did not ®nd that JTC correlated with the number or severity of current delusions (on an`index of deludedness'). The studies show a higher error rate in deluded participants, although it is in absolute terms low and only statistically signi®cant in two studies Young & Bentall, 1997a) ; there is a further suggestion that errors are more numerous with emotionally salient material.
There are a number of variations in the ®ndings. Most studies have employed both a clinical and a non-clinical control group. The ®nding of JTC always diåerentiated the deluded groups from the non-clinical, the depressed and the OCD controls; however, in the Garety et al. (1991) study an anxious control group did not signi®cantly diåer from the delusional disorder group, although they did diåer from the schizophrenia group. JTC is more likely across groups for emotionally salient material, but this may be further exaggerated in people with delusions (Dudley et al., 1997b) . A discon®rmatory bias (i.e. shifting probability estimates downwards following potentially discon®rmatory information) was found in four studies when deluded groups were compared to non-clinical controls Garety et al., 1991 ; Peters et al., 1997 ; Young & Bentall, 1997a) ; however, this did not always distinguish deluded groups from depressed and OCD controls.
Although groups of deluded participants typically had a higher proportion of males, there is no evidence of a sex diåerence. In general, the groups did not diåer in IQ; however, the contribution of IQ to performance has not been systematically studied. Garety et al. (1991) , on a post hoc analysis, found evidence that JTC was associated with lower IQ, while Mortimer et al. (1996) did not ®nd a correlation with IQ, as measured by the mini mental state examination. Finally, the most extreme reasoning bias (using only one item of information, on an 85 : 15 ratio) is not present in all people who are currently deluded, although it is present in a signi®cant proportion (where given, percentages range between 40 and 70 %). Maher (1992) has debated the interpretation of the ®ndings, referring speci®cally to the ®rst (Huq et al., 1988) study. He points out that the diåerence between the groups does not indicate that the people with delusions showed faulty inferences : the participants with delusions made few errors and the mean number of draws taken to reach a decision (2.2) represents better Bayesian reasoning than the control groups. After two beads of the same colour have been drawn, the objective Bayesian probability that the beads have been drawn from the jar with predominantly beads of that colour is 97 %. This, Maher (1992) argues, was therefore a reasonable point to make a decision. The control subjects, as has been previously found, were in contrast over-cautious in their estimates (Edwards, 1982) . Thus, although the results indicate that the people with delusions request less information before reaching a decision than controls, Maher (1992) argues that the ®ndings fail to demonstrate any support for`the faulty-inference hypothesis of schizophrenic delusions' (p. 106).
It is noteworthy that, as a group, the people with delusions responded according to Bayesian norms, in contrast to the conservative performance of controls. However, there was considerable variability in the deluded group, and nearly half made a decision on the basis of one draw (rather than two), at an objective probability of 85 %, which is very rare in controls and can be considered incautious, when certainty is the task criterion. These patterns were repeated in subsequent studies. Overall, these ®ndings should not be interpreted as evidence of a de®cit, an inability to reason probabilistically or to test hypotheses, but rather of a tendency or bias to the early acceptance and, to a lesser extent, the early rejection of hypotheses. This, may, under certain conditions, contribute to erroneous inferences and, therefore, to delusion formation. No diåerences between the groups in age or IQ (current and estimated pre-morbid). There were no diåerences between the groups on task performance, and all groups altered probability estimates in the same way in response to changes in the strength of the evidence. The authors conclude that the apparent discrepancy with previous probabilistic reasoning research may be owing to an important task diåerenceÐin this study, participants are given all the information to be considered rather than being free to decide when they have su¬cient information.
6. Linney et al., 1998 General (student) population (40) divided into : problem ; one probability judgmentÐcoin-tossing task) but not on other two tasks involving hypothesis testing and aggregation of probabilistic information. Diåerences re¯ected`jumping to conclusions ' on 2±4±6 task and taking less account of varying sample sizes on coin tossing task. Authors conclude that there is evidence of a data-gathering bias, independent of whether information is pre-determined. Because this is found in a non-clinical high delusional ideation population, they argue it may suggest that a reasoning bias is implicated in delusion formation rather than just delusion maintenance.
* high delusional ideation
Evidence of reasoning bias from studies employing other tasks
The above studies showed that, on a particular test of probabilistic reasoning, people with delusions jumped to conclusions. However, it is not clear how speci®c the ®ndings are to this reasoning task. A robust test of the hypothesis of rapid and overcon®dent judgments in people with delusions involves examining performance on other tasks. There have been six further studies recently conducted to explore reasoning in people with delusions further. All of these studies explicitly aimed to build on Garety and colleagues' work by employing diåerent tasks and normative frameworks to consider how general a bias there may be and} or to specify more precisely the biased reasoning processes in people with delusions. The studies have examined probability estimation, hypothesis testing, inductive reasoning and data gathering and formal logic (see Table 3 ). All the studies (except Linney, Peters & Ayton, 1998) recruited currently deluded participants, while Linney et al. recruited participants from the general population and divided them by high and low delusional ideation. Clinical control groups were generally drawn from populations of depressed patients, although Kemp, Chua, McKenna & David (1997) did not include such a control group. The ®ndings of these studies are mixed. Four studies found statistically signi®cant diåerences in performance between the deluded and control groups (John & Dodgson, 1994 ; Kemp et al., 1997 ; Linney et al., 1998 ; Young & Bentall, 1995) , while two of these studies found no diåerences (Bentall & Young, 1996 ; Dudley et al., 1997a) . Taken together, these negative and positive ®ndings provide interesting pointers to the nature of the reasoning bias in people with delusions. Bentall & Young's (1996) study suggests that people with delusions are able to test hypotheses when supplied with a range of options, while Dudley et al. (1997) found that people with delusions are similar to controls in their estimation of probabilities, again when all the information is supplied. The diåerences found by Young & Bentall (1995) and Kemp et al. (1997) represented poorer performance in both studies and were thought by the authors to re¯ect a di¬culty making use of sequential information and a weakness in formal logic respectively. The ®ndings of both John & Dodgson (1994) and Linney et al. (1998) were interpreted as re¯ecting diåerences in gathering information. In John & Dodgson, the deluded participants demonstrated à diåerence in cognitive processing style which limits the extent to which deluded subjects request information to help them form a decision ' (p. 45). Linney et al. studied the reasoning performance on four tasks of participants in the general population who were high in delusional ideation. No diåerences were found on tasks involving hypothesis testing and the aggregation of probabilistic information, indicating that the bias may not re¯ect di¬culties with sequential information, contrary to Young & Bentall's (1995) speculation. There were, however, diåerences on two tasks which the authors interpreted as re¯ecting a JTC style of data gathering. This bias in data gathering was independent of whether the information provided was pre-determined.
In these studies, the groups were generally matched for IQ and age and there is little to suggest that performance varied with IQ, excepting the study of formal logic by Kemp et al. (1997) . However, the use of multivariate analyses, in which IQ is covaried, would provide a better test of the involvement of IQ. Linney et al.'s (1998) study is the only one to employ a non-clinical population divided by delusional ideation. That there are diåerences in a non-clinical sample may suggest that the datagathering bias is implicated in delusion formation, although clearly it would be informative to attempt to replicate these performance diåerences both in another non-clinical population as well as in a clinical population.
Do people with delusions have reasoning bias ?
Of the 14 studies reviewed, 11 provide evidence for reasoning biases in people with delusions. The clearest ®ndings derive from the studies employing the Bayesian probabilistic reasoning paradigm : all seven studies which investigated data gathering found evidence of JTC. Taking all the studies together, a picture emerges of people with delusions showing a tendency to seek less information to reach a decision, but not, when presented with information, being unable to use it. People with delusions do not, it seems, have a probabilistic reasoning bias, as Garety and colleagues have previously suggested, in that they can estimate probabilities, but have a datagathering bias. This willingness to accept a hypothesis on the basis of less evidence than control groups is supported by two studies employing diåerent paradigms (John & Dodgson, 1994 ; Linney et al., 1998) . Contrary to Maher's hypothesis, it does seem that the reasoning bias found in people with delusions can lead to the acceptance of incorrect hypotheses. Moreover, the`discon®rmation' bias found in a number of the Bayesian studies suggests that people with delusions may be more ready to abandon existing hypotheses and form new ones, again on the basis of little evidence. These ®ndings apply to`neutral' task material, where the content is not thought to be of particular relevance to participants' concerns or to be emotional in content. However, there is evidence that emotional salience aåects people's reasoning in general and possibly aåects the reasoning of people with delusions to a greater extent (Dudley et al., 1997b ; Kemp et al., 1997 ; Young & Bentall, 1997a) . The negative ®ndings of these studies are also informative. They show that the results do not simply re¯ect de®cits in performance but can be speci®ed with some precision. The evidence that people with delusions are competent at certain reasoning tasks, such as testing hypotheses and aggregating information, is important clinically as well as theoretically.
PERSECUTORY DELUSIONS AS DEFENCE (BENTALL)
Bentall and his colleagues have proposed that people with persecutory delusions construct them to maintain self-esteem, avoiding discrepancies entering consciousness between how they perceive themselves to be and how they would like to be (Bentall, Kaney & Dewey, 1991 ; Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994 ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996a) . They argue that externalising causal attributions (persecutory delusions) are evoked for negative events which might otherwise increase the accessibility of underlying negative self-representations. As these researchers acknowledge, these ideas are similar to those of earlier theorists. For example, Zigler & Glick (1988) suggested that paranoia is a form of camou¯aged depression and Colby, Faught & Parkinson (1979) explained persecutory delusions as the product of a tendency to perceive threat to self-esteem combined with a protective externalising attributional bias. Bentall and colleagues' account is largely based on two sets of experimental ®ndings. The ®rst set concerns attributional style ; the second concerns discrepancies between overt and covert self-esteem.
Studies of attributional biases
Attributional style has been investigated primarily using the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ ; Peterson, Semmel, Von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky & Seligman, 1982) , which was originally used to investigate cognitive processes in depression. In the ASQ, a positive or a negative event involving the respondent is brie¯y described (e.g.`You get a pay rise '). The respondent is instructed to write down one major cause for the event, and then to rate the self-generated cause on three dimensions: internality, stability and globalness. It is the internality dimension (the cause is`due to something about you or something about other people or circumstances ') which is of central importance to the persecutory delusion-asdefence account, since it is proposed that an attributional style characterised by blaming other people for bad events and taking credit for good events is implicated in persecutory delusions. Bentall and colleagues describe this as an extreme form of the self-serving bias, which is reported to be present in the general population as a means of maintaining self-esteem . There are two methods of treating the internality data : one method involves calculating a composite diåerence score, which consists of attributional style for positive events minus attributional style for negative events and treating this measure as a single internality construct; the other method treats attributions for positive and negative events separately. Byrne & MacLeod (1997) criticise the former practice on the grounds that attributional styles for positive and negative events show a low degree of correlation and argue that attributions for positive and negative events should be treated separately. The present authors have therefore favoured this second method in reporting results in Table 4 , noting where the reported composite results do not permit inferences separately on internality for positive and negative events.
The ASQ has been criticised for poor reliability, in particular of the internality dimension, and Kinderman & Bentall (1996b) have consequently developed a new scale, the Internal Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ). They propose that three distinct attributional loci can be identi®ed on the ASQ internality dimension: an internal locus (attributing events to oneself), an external±personal locus (attributing the event to identi®able others), and an external±situational locus (attributing the causes of events to situations or chance). For example, if the negative event for which an explanation is requested is`You are late for an appointment', it is possible to attribute this externally either to a person (my partner made me late) or to a non-personal situation (the rain made the tra¬c terrible). Finally, there is a third questionnaire measure of attributions, the Social Attributions Questionnaire (SAQ) constructed by Bentall et al. (1991) , which is concerned with judgments about the social interactions between two other persons. Attributions are made to the actor (a person attribution), the target or victim (a stimulus attribution) or to the circumstances. Although`self-serving bias ' composite score is reported, it is accounted for by high externality for negative events, not high internality for positive events, relative to controlsÐon basis of visual examination of graphs (also personal comm (Bentall) On the ASQ, Bentall and colleagues predict that people with persecutory delusions will make externalising attributions for bad events and internalising attributions for good events, relative to controls. On the IPSAQ, they predict that paranoid participants will make excessively external attributions for bad events relative to depressed but not non-clinical controls, and that paranoid participants will make more personal rather than situational attributions relative to both groups of controls. Finally, for SAQ, they predict that patients with persecutory delusions will make more person attributions than controls. They do not make any predictions about non-persecutory delusions and they do not make predictions concerning diagnostic groups.
Most of the studies shown in Table 4 have been conducted by Bentall, Kaney, Kinderman and co-workers, although two other groups have contributed three studies (Candido & Romney, 1990 ; Fear, Sharp & Healy, 1996 ; Sharp, Fear & Healy, 1997) . All the studies employ a cross-sectional group design. Bentall and colleagues have adopted the general strategy of comparing a group of people with persecutory delusions with two control groups: people who are depressed and a nonclinical sample. In most cases, the persecutory delusions group consists of people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (the majority) or of delusional disorder; their other current psychotic symptoms are not generally reported, although depression scores are. Studies typically have more male than female participants. Table 4 shows ®ve studies which have employed the ASQ, and whether an externalising bias for negative events and an internalising bias for positive events were found. It shows clear evidence that people with persecutory delusions, when compared to depressed and non-clinical control groups, show a bias to excessively external attributions for negative events. All ®ve studies supportthis conclusion. The evidence in support of an internalising bias for good events is much less strong. Three out of ®ve studies did not ®nd this bias (Fear et al., 1996 ; Lyon, Kaney & Bentall, 1994 ; Sharp et al., 1997) . The study by Candido & Romney (1990) only provides a comparison with a depressed group (well known to demonstrate the opposite bias) and no non-clinical control, and the study by reported a composite analysis of attributional style, as described above, so that the results are di¬cult to interpret. Taking the results of these ®ve studies together, it cannot therefore be concluded that people with delusions are excessively selfserving: in general they do not diåer from non-clinical controls in taking credit for good events.
Results of attributional bias studies
Using the IPSAQ, Kinderman & Bentall (1997) found that the participants with persecutory delusions showed a personalising bias for negative events (that is they blamed other people for them) in comparison to both depressed and non-clinical controls. They were, however, not more likely to show either an externalising bias for negative events or an internalising bias for positive events than the non-clinical controls: that is, overall, the patients with delusions did not attribute blame externally for bad events or take credit for good events. It therefore seems probable that the attributional bias of people with persecutory delusions is not in general externalising or speci®cally self-serving, but rather personalising: a tendency to blame other people when things go wrong.
The results of two further studies of attributions in people with delusions, using the SAQ, are also shown in Table 4 (Bentall, Kaney & Dewey, 1991 ; Young & Bentall, 1997b) . The ®rst study found a tendency for people with delusions to make person attributions, compared to controls, for negative events ; however, recently, using a somewhat diåerent methodology, Young & Bentall (1997b) failed to replicate this. Indeed, Young & Bentall found no diåerence at all between groups in their attributions and in changes made to attributions when new information was given. They concluded that self-referent tasks may be essential for demonstrating attributional biases in patients with persecutory delusions. Fear et al. (1996) and Sharp et al. (1997) have investigated the speci®city of an externalising attributional style to persecutory delusions, focusing their investigations on people with a diagnosis of delusional disorder. They thus address two questions of speci®city : are attributional biases found in people with delusional disorder, since most previous studies were primarily of people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and are these biases con®ned to persecutory delusions? The ®ndings are mixed. There are preliminary grounds for hypothesising that the externalising bias for bad events may be speci®c to persecutory and grandiose delusions. Sharp et al. (1997) conclude that their ®ndings argue against a primary aetiological role for attributional style in the genesis of delusions, but suggest that such a style may shape delusional content.
Are attributions biased in people with persecutory delusions ?
In terms of the key question of attributional style, a fairly consistent picture emerges from these eight studies. People with persecutory delusions do have attributional biases : they show an externalising bias for bad events, when the material is selfreferent. When these external attributions are further divided into personalising and situational, there is early evidence that people with delusions are particularly inclined to blame people rather than situations or chance ; when attributions are examined in this way, they may not be more generally inclined to externalise blame. On the current evidence, people with persecutory delusions do not seem to be particularly biased to internalising when attributing causes for good events : overall, then, they are not particularly self-serving. In sum, people with persecutory delusions, when confronted with self-referent material, are particularly likely to see other people as responsible for bad events.
Self-discrepancies
The second set of experimental evidence, invoked to support the proposal that persecutory delusions act as a defence, concerns studies of discrepancies between overt and covert levels of self-esteem or self-representations. This proposal is complex, both conceptually and methodologically, and has been developed over time. Therefore the following ®rst brie¯y considers both the conceptual issue, which concerns the proposal of discrepancies in self-esteem and the self-concept, and the methodological problem of eliciting such discrepancies, before reviewing the relevant studies.
Self-esteem is an evaluative component of the`self-concept', a broader term which embraces beliefs concerning relatively speci®c aspects of the self (such as musical ability, gender identity and so on) and self-esteem (Brewin, 1988) . In earlier formulations of their theory, Bentall and colleagues argued that persecutory delusions re¯ect a defensive, self-serving attributional style which protects the individual against underlying feelings of low self-esteem (e.g. Bentall, 1994 ; Lyon et al., 1994) . Bentall et al. (1994) have adopted a more elaborate model proposed by Higgins (1987) which invokes`self-discrepancies ' in terms of three basic domains (actual self, ideal self and ought self) and in terms of two basic standpoints: the point of view of the self and the viewpoint of the other. Higgins argues that the term`low self-esteem ' generally refers either to a negative actual self-concept or to a discrepancy between the actual self-ideal self. Diåerent forms of emotional discomfort (depression, anxiety, shame) are predicted by speci®c self-discrepancies. For example, dejection-related emotions (dissatisfaction, sadness) are predicted by the presence of an actual self-ideal self-discrepancy. Bentall et al. (1994) , drawing on Higgins' account, have re®ned their proposal, positing that the person with persecutory delusions has an attributional bias which serves to minimise discrepancies between the actual self and the ideal self at the cost of externalising causal attributions and thereby generating discrepancies between the actual-self and the actual-other domains. Bentall and colleagues do not generally claim that the defensive function of persecutory delusions protects the individual from depression, although it seems that this should be predicted by Higgins' model since it is the actual self-ideal self-discrepancy which is associated with dejectionrelated emotions. They propose that the self-serving attributional bias minimises the awareness of discrepancies between actual±ideal representations of the self, in order to maintain a positive explicit self-concept.
Thus Kinderman & Bentall (1996a) predicted that paranoid delusions would be associated with positive self-ratings in the actual-self domain and a high degree of consistency between the actual self-concept and both the ideal-self and ought-self concepts. Similarly, Bentall (1994) noted that a paradoxical combination of`high selfesteem and high depression' will occur if delusions function to defend against low self-esteem. The model predicts that people with persecutory delusions will show overt normal or high self-esteem, or a positive explicit self-concept. However, in à weaker ' formulation of the delusion-as-defence account, it could be argued that the delusion is only partially successful (i.e. it does not fully preserve self-esteem). Therefore the most important prediction of the model is that there will be a discrepancy between overt and covert measures of self-esteem, in that overt measures will not show actual±ideal self-discrepancies, while on covert measures such a discrepancy will be detected.
Studies of overt and covert negative self-concepts : detecting a discrepancy
The studies reviewed have used diåerent methods to assess overt self-esteem (see Table 5 ). First, there are standardised questionnaire measures, the Coopersmith Self- Although not given in the paper, the norms for the CSEI show that the non-depressed paranoid group have normal self-esteem, while the depressed paranoid group have low self-esteem (more than 1 SD below mean) and the depressed group very low self-esteem (more than 2 SD below mean). Thus, self-esteem scores decreased as depression increased, although no correlation is reported. The study does not make clear whether patients in thè paranoid ' groups all had persecutory delusions.
2. Lyon et al., 1994 (see also N} A This study used data from a therapy trial. Data were analysed cross-sectionally at baseline, and longitudinally separately for the therapy and treatment as usual control. It examined levels of self-esteem in patients with and without persecutory delusions and the relationship of self-esteem to measures of depression and of delusions. Both groups showed low selfesteem relative to population norms. Negative correlations were found between depression and self-esteem, both crossselectionally and longitudinally in people with persecutory delusions. About 30 % of people with persecutory delusions had normal self-esteem, and a cross-sectional analysis found higher conviction in their delusions and lower depression and anxiety. Although not replicated longitudinally, the authors conclude this may be consistent with a defensive process for a subgroup.
5. Kinderman, 1994 1. Persecutory delusions (16) 2. Depressed (16) 3. Non-clinical controls (16)
This study was a direct test of discrepancies between overt self-ratings (as self-descriptive, 30 positive and 30 negative personally descriptive adjectives) and the covertly accessed responses of the EST (using a sample of the same adjectives). The persecutory group was mildly} moderately depressed. On the EST, both patient groups were slowed by negative words, while persecutory group only was slowed relative to non-clinical controls by positive words. This is consistent with delusional disorder group having a negative self-concept, which might be related to depression. The overt ratings are di¬cult to interpretation (see text) but the persecutory group did not diåer from depressed group in extent to which they endorsed as self-descriptive negative adjectives. Therefore a discrepancy does not seem to be found. 
N} A
The study was designed to investigate attentional biases rather than self-discrepancies. Both persecutory and depressed groups were depressed. While persecutory group was speci®cally slowed in colour naming threat content words, the depressed group was selectively slowed in colour naming depressive content words. This study does not support the hypothesis that the persecutory group had an implicit negative selfconcept. N} A The EST part of the study largely designed as a replication of with delusional disorder patients and with addition of anxiety words. The EST was employed to identify`covert depressive biases '. Both persecutory and nonpersecutory group slowed by colour naming threat words, while non-persecutory group only diåered from controls in slowing with depression and anxiety-related words. Authors conclude that there is an inferred absence of covert depressive cognitions in persecutory group. The study failed to replicate Kinderman et al. (1992) on the ASQ re-rating, the authors concluding that the deluded participants`were not concealing anything '. High scores were found on the DAS which did not diåer between groups with persecutory and non-persecutory delusions. Authors consider that high DAS may aggravate and maintain any psychiatric condition.
8. Kinderman et al., 1992 1. Persecutory delusions (delusional disorder and schizophrenia) (23) 2. Depressed (depression and anorexia nervosa) (21) 3. Non-clinical control (28) ASQ re-rating
Study pooled data from previous study and newly collected data. Independent judges re-rated causes previously generated by participants for internality. While deluded participants only rated own generated causes as external for negative events, ragings by judges were more internal. Authors conclude that deluded group has a particular tendency to bias their ratings of their own explanations of negative events towards the external, in order to defend self-esteem. Results thought to represent a form of self-deception, preventing deluded participants becoming aware of negatively self-referent attitudes (see text for discussion). This study investigated a range of cognitive processes in people with delusions, self-schema, cognitive inhibition and probabilistic reasoning. The PIT was considered to access self-schemata. On the PIT the deluded group did not diåer from the control group, but did diåer from depressed group, who showed expected internal attributions for negative events. Underlying low self-esteem in the deluded group could not be con®rmed. The groups with depression and delusions had higher DAS scores than non-clinical controls, the highest scores in the depressed group. Authors argue that high DAS scores imply self-discrepancies. On the SRIRT both deluded groups and non-clinical control groups endorsed signi®cantly more positive than negative items than the depressed group and authors argue this represents a positive self-presentation bias. However, although analysis of this is not reported, visual inspection of the data suggests that both deluded groups endorsed numerically more negative words than normal controls and fewer than depressed group. The positive selfpresentation is more marked in the non-clinical control group. Overall, the recall data showed no bias in any of the groups. An analysis of endorsed words only showed that normal controls diåered from other groups in recalling more positive than negative words. The authors acknowledge that the SRIRT data are equivocal.
Results

Study
ASQ 5 Attributional Style Questionnaire; CSEI 5 Coopersmith Self Esteem Inventory; DAS Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1984 ; used by Candido & Romney, 1990) , the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire (Rosenberg, 1965 ; employed by Lyon et al., 1994 ) and the Self-Concept Questionnaire (Robson, 1989 ; used by Freeman et al., 1998) . These questionnaires set out to measure global self-esteem (which is hypothesised to derive from self-discrepancies) rather than measuring a number of speci®c domains of the self. However, the Robson questionnaire does measure a number of domains. Secondly, Kinderman & Bentall (1996a) have used an adaptation of Higgins et al.'s (1986) Selves Questionnaire, the Personal Qualities Questionnaire, which involves generating personal attributes and which assesses actual-self, ideal-self and ought-self perceptions and also considers the standpoint of others. Finally, two studies which examined discrepancies (Bentall & Kaney, 1996 ; Kinderman, 1994) used methods involving the endorsement of positive and negative adjectives as self-descriptive, which provide an informal view of the self-concept; in both studies, the endorsement phase was a precursor to a second phase investigating covert processes.
There are seven studies which, in various ways, have examined covert self-esteem, ®ve of which have also investigated whether there is a discrepancy between overt and covert self-esteem (see also Table 5 ). It is a methodological challenge to elicit covert self-evaluations. The theory under discussion proposes that the individual is motivated to prevent these cognitions reaching consciousness and thus studies must employ methods of penetrating the defence, accessing cognitions of which the participant is neither aware nor wishes to be aware.
First, three studies have used the Emotional Stroop Task Fear et al., 1996 ; Kinderman, 1994) . The Emotional Stroop Task is thought to measure preconscious or automatic cognitive processes and has been widely used as a measure of covert attentional bias, signalling the emotional salience of words by slowed naming of the colours in which salient, as opposed to neutral or non-salient, words are printed (Brewin, 1988) . The studies described here have used as stimuli strings of Os, neutral words and, variously, depression-related, threat-related, anxiety-related and positive and negative self-descriptive words. Studies have shown the Stroop eåect even when participants are not consciously aware of the material presented (Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996) and it can therefore be regarded as a valid measure of individuals' covert concerns.
The second approach to attempting to`penetrate the defence ' was taken by Lyon et al. (1994) , drawing on earlier work with people with mania (Winters & Neale, 1985) . Peters et al. (1997) have attempted to replicate this work. In Lyon et al.'s original study, responses on a parallel form of the ASQ (ASQpf) are compared with responses to the Pragmatic Inference Task (PIT), a questionnaire disguised as a memory task but based on the original ASQ, and requiring respondents to make attributions. The ASQpf served as a measure of explicit attributions while the PIT served as a measure of implicit attributions. This seems to the present authors a valid approach, although it should be noted that it is attributions rather than selfevaluations which are tapped.
The third approach to assessing covert processes involves studies of ratings of internality on the ASQ (Fear et al., 1996 ; Kinderman, Kaney, Morley & Bentall, 1992) Kinderman et al. (1992) reanalysed the responses on the ASQ made by participants with persecutory delusions. Independent judges rated the causes, previously generated by the deluded participants, for internality or externality. (In the ASQ, participants ®rst generate a cause and then rate it on the three dimensions.) Kinderman et al. (1992) argue that if judges rate the causes generated for negative events as more internal than the deluded participants' own ratings, this may re¯ect a defensive process, protecting the deluded person from negatively self-referent attributions. A discrepancy between the actual and ideal self-concept is inferred. This seems to the present authors to be an indirect and rather weaker test of the hypothesis of a defended negative self-concept, since an explanation of biases in internality ratings requires a further hypothesis. In Kinderman et al.' s case this is that the participants' ®rst response (stating a cause of an event) is answered non-defensively, whereas the subsequent rating for internality activates the defence. This process is repeated many times on the ASQ ; it seems just as plausible that the defensive responding would also occur in response to stating the cause, at least after a few responses. A more parsimonious explanation of the results might be that the internality ratings simply re¯ect an overt externalising bias. The unreliability of the internality dimension is also noteworthy in this context (Reivich, 1995) . Whereas defensive processes may be implicated, it is possible that the deluded participants diåered for other non-defensive reasons in their use of the rating scale.
Finally, Bentall & Kaney (1996) used two`indirect assessments of self-schemata ' selected to access negative self-representations even with highly defensive individuals. The measures used were the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS ; Weissman & Beck, 1978 (also employed by Fear et al., 1996) ) and an incidental recall task, the Self-Referent Incidental Recall Task (SRIRT). Both measures have previously been used to study the role of self-schemata in depression. The DAS measures beliefs or attitudes which delineate excessively rigid and perfectionistic criteria for evaluating personal performance and self-worth. Bentall & Kaney (1996) propose that attitudes of this sort are likely to make one vulnerable to experiencing discrepancies between self-representations and self-ideals. However, it is not clear that the DAS is an indirect measure of self-schemata (i.e. that it assesses implicit} covert self-esteem), as is claimed : as a self-report measure, it attempts to assess self-schemata directly. It is also not clear that vulnerability to self-discrepancies implies active self-discrepancies. A direct measure of self-representation employed was a list of positive (success-related) and negative (failure-related) adjectives, which participants were asked to endorse as self-descriptive. A surprise recall task (SRIRT) of these lists was then used to access self-schemata covertly. The present authors consider that the SRIRT is likely to be a valid method of accessing covert selfevaluations, since it is based on evidence of the self-referent encoding eåect, the general tendency for superior recall of words which have been encoded in relation to self-schemata (see Bentall & Kaney, 1996) . Table 5 ®rst shows the direct studies of overt self-esteem. The ®ndings are mixed from the four direct studies of overt self-esteem and persecutory delusions. Lyon et al. (1994) and Kinderman & Bentall (1996a) have found support for their proposal of normal or high self-esteem} low self-discrepancies, whereas Freeman et al. (1998) found low self-esteem across all the Robson domains, both in people with persecutory delusions and in other patients with positive symptoms of psychosis. Candido & Romney (1990) found self-esteem to be normal in a non-depressed paranoid group, but to be low in a depressed paranoid group. Self-esteem therefore diåered with levels of depression, as it did in the Lyon et al. study. Freeman et al. (1998) examined the relationship with depression. In people with persecutory delusions, self-esteem and depression were negatively correlated, cross-sectionally and longitudinally, which was considered to be consistent with normal emotional processes rather than defensive processes. However, they found a subgroup (30 %) of people with persecutory delusions had normal levels of self-esteem. The two other studies, which used a more informal measure of the endorsement of positive and negative words as self-descriptive, had equivocal ®ndings (Bentall & Kaney, 1996 ; Kinderman, 1994) . Taking all six studies together the evidence does not strongly support the hypothesis of high or normal self-esteem in people with persecutory delusions, but may suggest that there are subgroups of people with persecutory delusions with normal self-esteem and others with low self-esteem.
Results from the studies of discrepancies in overt and covert self-esteem
Of course, ®nding evidence of low self-esteem in people with persecutory delusions does not preclude the weaker version of the delusion-as-defence account in which the delusion prevents self-esteem falling further. A test of this rests more squarely on evidence of a discrepancy between overt and covert self-esteem. However, with the`weaker ' version, one would expect a correlation over time between levels of self-esteem and the degree of conviction in the persecutory delusion, so that if the conviction diminishes, self-esteem is also lowered. Freeman et al. (1998) examined such data longitudinally and found little evidence for the predicted association, taking this as evidence against both the`strong' and thè weak ' versions of the delusion-as-defence account.
Six studies have attempted to penetrate the defence and examine covert selfesteem. Only two of these studies have found convincing evidence of an implicit low self-esteem (Kinderman, 1994 ; Lyon et al., 1994) , using the Emotional Stroop Task and the Pragmatic Inference Task respectively. Other studies employing these tasks have not con®rmed the presence of covert negative self-esteem. Peters et al. (1997) , in a study with a group of people with a variety of types of delusions, found no covert internalising bias on the PIT for negative events. On the EST, both and Fear et al. (1996) found an attentional bias to threat and not to depressive words in the persecutory deluded group, ®ndings which are not consistent with covert low self-esteem. Finally, the data from the Bentall & Kaney (1996) selfreferent recall task did not ®nd clear evidence of biases in recall re¯ecting a covert negative self-concept.
However, ®nding evidence of a covert negative self-concept is not su¬cient to support the proposal of persecutory delusions as defence. This requires evidence of an overt±covert discrepancy. Five studies have attempted to examine this (see Table  5 ). Only one study, that by Lyon et al. (1994) of explicit and implicit attributions, provides clear evidence of a discrepancy with a method which is of high validity (although of attributions rather than directly of self-concepts, as discussed above). The ®ndings of all the other studies are less clear. Kinderman et al. (1992) , in their study of independent judges re-rating deluded participants' internality ratings, have ®ndings which are intriguing but are di¬cult to interpret, as discussed above; furthermore they have not been replicated by Fear et al. (1996) . The present authors do not consider high scores on the DAS (found by Fear et al., 1996 and Bentall & Kaney, 1996) to provide convincing evidence of active covert self-discrepancies, as discussed above. Fear et al. (1996) suggest that highly dysfunctional attitudes might be found in a variety of psychiatric conditions, citing evidence of a high DAS score in people with obsessive compulsive disorder. Other researchers have found DAS scores to be raised in symptomatic and remitted patients with a variety of psychiatric disorders (e.g. Hill et al., 1989 ; Silverman et al., 1984) . Fear et al. (1996) interpret the high DAS scores of their deluded participants as re¯ecting dysfunctional attitudes which might be expected to maintain any psychiatric condition. However, Bentall & Kaney (1996) do consider DAS scores as re¯ecting self-discrepancies. Finally, Kinderman (1994) interprets his ®ndings as evidence of discrepancies. The present authors diåer in their interpretation of his study, and are doubtful that discrepancies are shown. Kinderman (1994) compares the results of an overt measure (endorsement of positive and negative adjectives as self-descriptive) with the covert measure (the EST of attentional bias to positive and negative adjectives). The present authors accept Kinderman's conclusion that there is evidence of a covert negative self-concept from the results of the EST in the persecutory group; this may, however, be accounted for by the levels of depression in the group. The interpretation of the pattern of endorsement of adjectives shown by the persecutory group in the overt phase is more complex. Kinderman analysed two sets of data, the endorsement as self-descriptive of the words from the whole questionnaire and the endorsement of a smaller group of words subsequently used in the EST. Whereas the deluded group endorsed similar numbers of positive words as the control group, they endorsed similar numbers of negative words as the depressed group; this latter ®nding is clearer when all words are considered, where the persecutory group and the depressed group do not diåer from each other but diåer from controls, while for the target words the persecutory group fell between the control and depressed group, diåering from neither. Therefore, on overt self-rating, the deluded group did not diåer from a depressed group in terms of the extent to which low self-esteem words were seen as selfdescriptive; consequently, the interference of such words in the EST does not seem to the present authors to be discrepant and to provide evidence for a defence. Kinderman, however, concludes that a discrepancy has been found. He diåers in his interpretation by emphasising, not the actual endorsement of low self-esteem words, but the relative rate of endorsement of positive and negative words: the deluded group rated more positive words as self-descriptive than the depressed group. He therefore concludes that the deluded participants' rating of the negative words is signi®cantly less self-descriptive' (p. 63) than the depressed participants' ratings. This does not seem to the present authors to follow : if negative words are endorsed, they will be salient regardless of the endorsement of positive words. Indeed, the slowing of the deluded group on the EST by both positive and negative words is entirely consistent with this.
Most of the studies reviewed here have employed groups of people with persecutory delusions. Are the ®ndings speci®c to such delusions? Only Fear et al. (1996) and Freeman et al. (1998) compared groups of people with psychosis with and without persecutory delusions. Freeman et al. (1988) found no diåerences between their groups on measures of overt self-esteem, and Fear et al. (1996) found few diåerences on a range of measures between their deluded groups. There is no evidence to indicate that the processes investigated here are speci®c to persecutory delusions. Similarly, the present authors cannot draw any conclusions from these studies about the role of diagnosis. Most studies have employed diagnostically mixed groups and have not systematically investigated diåerences by diagnosis. Finally, whether IQ or gender diåerences aåect these ®ndings has not been systematically studied, although most studies have attempted to match groups by gender.
Do people with persecutory delusions have positive self-esteem and self-discrepancies ? Do persecutory delusions serve a defence ?
A very impressive series of studies is discussed above, largely conducted by Bentall, Kaney and Kinderman and colleagues, but supplemented by the work of other groups. Overall the ®ndings of these 10 studies are variable and a consistent picture does not emerge, whether of levels of overt self-esteem or of self-discrepancies. First, in terms of the data on overt self-esteem, it is important to consider the role of depression. In all three studies which examined this, self-esteem scores were inversely related to depression scores (Candido & Romney, 1990 ; Freeman et al., 1998 ; Lyon et al., 1994) . This is what would be expected in the general population and does not re¯ect the`paradoxical combination of high self-esteem and high depression' proposed by Bentall (1994) . Freeman et al. (1998) have argued that where depression and self-esteem scores are related in this way, this favours an account which invokes the role of`normal emotional processes', in which self-esteem and depression are closely and reciprocally related, rather than an account based on defensive processes. Secondly, the studies here have not established that overt±covert self-esteem discrepancies are present, which is the central prediction of both the`strong' and thè weak ' versions of the Bentall and colleagues' theory. To demonstrate such a proposal is challenging. The present authors have proposed that the methods in some of the studies reviewed are of questionable validity and therefore the interpretation of the results is problematic. The review of these studies ®nds support for overt±covert self-esteem discrepancies in one study, but in four further studies the authors consider the balance of evidence is against discrepancies in two and uncertain in two. In view of this, they cannot conclude that there is yet strong empirical support for the persecutory delusions as a defence theory. An externalising attributional bias for negative events has been convincingly demonstrated in people with persecutory delusions. This element of the theory is well supported by evidence. However, an externalising bias for negative events does not necessarily serve a defensive function. The present critical analysis of a number of studies suggests that although a proportionof people with persecutory delusions may have normal or high self-esteem, this proportion may be less than half. Furthermore they are often depressed, which is not predicted by the re-worked theory of Bentall et al. (1994) , since dejection-related emotions are not expected if actual±ideal self-discrepancies are minimised by a defence. These ®ndings of low self-esteem and depression are also important clinically. The evidence does not con®rm crucially that overt±covert selfesteem discrepancies are present in the majority of cases ; however, the present authors do consider that the equivocal results reviewed in the preceding section argue for the possibility that the defence account applies to a subgroup.
CONCLUSIONS
A number of empirical studies investigating three diåerent accounts of delusion have been reviewed above. None of the accounts, as originally formulated, is fully supported. However, considerable progress has been made in recent years in replicating experimental results which provide evidence of cognitive processes implicated in delusions. First, the present authors have found strong support for a reasoning bias in people with delusions which is best described as a data-gathering bias, a tendency for people with delusions to gather less evidence than controls so that they jump to conclusions. This may be exaggerated with emotive or self-referent material but is also present with material which does not apparently relate to the individual's current concerns. This does not lead directly to errors, but may facilitate the early acceptance of incorrect hypotheses. Secondly, there is strong evidence of an attributional bias in people with persecutory delusions, which leads to externalising blame for negative events; there are early indications that this may result from a particular tendency to personaliseÐthat is, to blame people rather than situations when things go wrong. However, whether this attributional bias functions in general to defend against underlying low self-esteem is more doubtful; the present authors do, however, consider that the defence account may apply to a subgroup of people with persecutory delusions. It is also not established whether these attributional biases are speci®c to persecutory as opposed to other types of delusions. Finally, a number of recent studies suggests that people with persecutory and other delusions may be poor at representing the mental states of others, although this de®cit may be related to a more general reasoning factor.
There are a number of general methodological and conceptual issues which arise from this review. The authors note that few studies provide details on the process of participant recruitment; for example refusals to participate are very rarely reported. The studies also diåer a great deal in the characteristics of participants recruited. For example, studies may recruit in-patients, or males, or groups with delusions and low depression scores. Many of the studies do not systematically investigate the possible eåects of such variables on the results. Whereas Bentall and colleagues have paid attention to the role of depression, and Frith and colleagues to IQ, other variables which may plausibly contribute to the data such as gender, ethnicity, medication, overall psychopathology, anxiety and the duration of illness have been less systematically studied. The reliability of methods for allocating participants to groups on the basis of delusional subtypes is uncertain. Many studies do not report explicit criteria for group allocation. In some studies the terms paranoid' and`persecutory' are used interchangeably and without de®nition, and there is no general agreement about the grouping of diåerent subtypes of delusion (so that studies may combine in a`persecutory' group delusions of persecution and reference, persecutory and grandiose delusions or persecutory and passivity delusions). The studies also often omit to clarify whether participants hold concurrently a number of diåerent types of delusion. The application of clear criteria for the membership of the category of persecutory delusion is needed.
A key conceptual issue arising from this review concerns the speci®city of the diåerent accounts. Frith's approach is the most speci®c. His theory of mind proposals are addressed at delusions as symptoms of schizophrenia and at speci®c subtypes of delusion: persecution and reference, but not passivity. However, he does allow that the same de®cits may also be found in patients with negative symptoms and not delusions. Bentall and colleagues have speci®ed that their account applies to people with persecutory delusions, regardless of diagnosis, but have not set out to examine whether their ®ndings are speci®c to persecutory delusions (although Fear and colleagues have investigated this). Garety and colleagues' account is the least speci®c : they have made no proposals concerning delusional subtypes and in an investigation of diagnostic speci®city found no diåerences in reasoning between participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and of delusional disorder. They also explicitly invoke a variety of cognitive processes in a multifactorial account.
The approaches reviewed can be seen to overlap in the phenomena they purport to explain. The accounts are also not contradictory. It is therefore quite possible that the diåerent processes highlighted by the diåerent theories may co-occur and may even interact. For example, Bentall & Kinderman (1998) have speculated that theory of mind de®cits may be related to personalising attributional biases. Similarly, datagathering biases may plausibly interact with a biased attributional style to result in hasty decisions about the intentions of others. Questions also remain to be answered about the applicability of these ®ndings of cognitive biases and de®cits to other symptoms of psychosis (addressed by Frith and colleagues and to a lesser extent by Garety and colleagues), to non-persecutory delusions and to delusions in speci®c diagnostic contexts. That perceptual processes are probably a central factor in some delusions, as Maher (1974) argued, is also important. The present authors consider a multifactorial account is consistent with the ®ndings to date. However, future research should examine these diåerent processes together and set out to specify with more precision which processes are likely to be active in which people with delusions.
Most of the studies reviewed are cross-sectional and demonstrate associations rather than cause. The processes examined may serve as maintaining factors or even consequences of current delusional ideation rather than as causes. Approaches which study patients in remission (e.g. Corcoran et al., 1995) , which use longitudinal methodology (e.g. Freeman et al., 1998) , or non-clinical participants with high delusional ideation (e.g. Linney et al., 1998) are valuable in mapping the relationship to these cognitive processes over time. Interestingly, Frith and colleagues have thereby convincingly demonstrated that theory of mind de®cits are not present in patients in remission, which suggests that these de®cits are not trait variables which predispose people to develop delusions.
It is noted in the introduction above that the single symptom approach has been commended as oåering promise for the future. How has it fared in this review ? Persons (1986) listed a number of advantages of this approach : the avoidance of the misclassi®cation of participants ; the study of important phenomena which are often ignored; the facilitation of theoretical development; the isolation of single elements of pathology for study; the recognition of the continuity of clinical phenomena with normal phenomena; and improvements in diagnostic classi®cation. Apart from the ®rst and last of these (avoidance of misclassi®cation and improved diagnosis), it is apparent that the research reviewed here has demonstrated these bene®ts. However, it should be noted that Frith and colleagues have taken a symptom approach rather than a single symptom one. They have therefore been able not only to isolate single elements of pathology for study but also to contrast diåerent symptoms. A single symptom approach has the disadvantages of ignoring the complexity of presentation of individuals with delusions: frequently clusters of symptoms co-occur (as do subtypes of delusions), and it is proposed here that future theoretical development should incorporate attention to both single symptoms and clusters of symptoms. Single case studies, which incorporate longitudinal methodology, also provide valuable data, as demonstrated by the case studies in .
An additional conceptual issue concerns the multidimensional nature of delusions. This view proposes that delusions have a number of important characteristics, such as conviction, distress, preoccupation and action, which are relatively independent of each other and are found to diåer along continua (Garety & Hemsley, 1994 ; Strauss, 1969) . The research reviewed here mostly takes a categorical view, treating delusions as present} absent and, in line with standard diagnostic approaches, employing only the characteristic of conviction. The¯uctuations in diåerent dimensions are ignored. Cognitive accounts of delusion which consider other characteristics, such as the clinically important one of distress, may have much to oåer. In their studies of hallucinations Chadwick & Birchwood (1994) and Close & Garety (1998) have examined how appraisals of the content and meaning of hallucinations predict distress. The present authors have recently taken this approach with delusional distress (Freeman & Garety, in press) . They suggest that a fuller account of delusions which can give due credit to the multidimensional nature of delusions will incorporate content as well as cognitive processes, for example by considering the individual's appraisals of their delusional beliefs.
Some implications can be drawn for cognitive therapy approaches from this work. The studies of a variety of reasoning processes, which found that people with delusions are competent at testing hypotheses and probabilistic reasoning, are important in that these abilities can be used in cognitive therapy. On the basis of the evidence reviewed, therapy for delusions should address any tendency to jump to conclusions, aim to work on personalising or externalising attributions and enhance social understanding. The mixed ®ndings on depression and self-esteem suggest they should be assessed carefully and interventions tailored accordingly. This is in keeping with Trower & Chadwick's (1995) recommendations. They suggest that, for patients with explicit low self-esteem and high levels of depression, the intervention should focus on negative self-evaluative beliefs before addressing delusional beliefs, an approach which is not relevant where negative self-evaluations are not apparent.
This review has also highlighted the need for further theoretical and empirical development of the understanding of the possible direct rather than defensive relationship between emotional processes, such as depression and anxiety, and delusions. Consistent with this approach, Birchwood & Iqbal (1998) have argued that depression and loss of self-esteem in some people with psychosis may be viewed as a reaction to the experience of psychosis as an uncontrollable traumatic life event. The need for further work on this is apparent from a recent study of cognitivebehavioural therapy for psychosis which found improvements in delusions and hallucinations, and reductions in delusional distress, but no changes in levels of depression or self-esteem.
What are the important future directions of this research into cognitive processes in delusions? The authors consider the major outstanding issues to be clarifying the aetiological status of ®ndings, examining the co-occurrence of the diåerent cognitive processes, clarifying the speci®city of the theories, and investigating more fully the contribution of a number of variables such as IQ, medication and depression to the eåects found. They suggest that research which uses patients with early psychosis, non-clinical samples with high delusional ideation or longitudinal methods will be informative. Investigations which bring together attributions, theory of mind tasks and non-social reasoning will clarify their relationships. A multidimensional approach to delusions which examines content, cognitive processes and emotional processes is advocated.
The evidence reviewed here is consistent with a multifactorial account of delusions. It is probable that delusions, understood as attempts to explain experiences or events, develop against a background of a person's existing personality and beliefs and as a result of a combination of alterations or biases in perception, aåect and judgment. A multifactorial account may be the best available, but it is not informative unless more precise relationships can be speci®ed and predictions made. It will be with `healthy discord' of controversy and disagreement that one may hope to arrive at some better understanding.
